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This paper represents a slightly modified version of the introduction to the French translation
of the author’s book How rich countries got rich…and why poor countries stay poor. Paris, Éditions
du Rocher, forthcoming 2012.
December 2011I am very pleased that this work is being made available in French. As is
made clear in the book, many of the ideas in the book also have French ori-
gins, as in the prototype national strategy of Colbertism. Indeed, the first
clear discussion of the need for national industrial policy in any language is
probably in Barthélemy Laffemas’ 1597 Response aux difficultez propo-
sees, containing 8 questions and answers, found as an appendix in some
copies of his publication Reiglement general pour dresser les manufactures
en ce rayaume, et couper le cours des draps de soye, & autres merchan-
dises qui perdent & ruynent l‘Estat. The Colbertian principles of nation-build-
ing through the establishment of manufactures and the construction of
infrastructure later formed the guidelines for the building of modern Europe.  
When the latest words in this book were written – during the last days of
December 2006 – I formulated three predictions on the next to last page:  
‘First of all, a major financial crisis is increasingly likely, and Key-
nesianism shall have to be re-invented in a new and global con-
text. ‘Free trade’ as the centerpiece of the present world economic
order is likely to delay the solution to future problems in much the
same way as a stubborn belief in the ‘gold standard’ delayed Key-
nesianism in the 1930s.’  
The first part of this prediction proved correct, the West had a major finan-
cial crisis in the private sector in 2008. As part of solving this crisis, the
debt was taken over by the respective governments, opening up for the
financial crisis which is still unfolding as these words are written. Howev-
er, the second part of the prediction – that Keynesianism needs to be rein-
vented on a global scale – is not taking place, in spite of some early dis-
cussions in that direction in 2008.    
What we have mostly been seeing, both in the US and in the European
Union, is the opposite of Keynesianism: the political gut feeling has been a
monetarist one – cutting budgets and reducing national demand – rather
than the Keynesian one of attempting to keep production, demand, and
employment up. Europe and the United States are now experiencing the
same kind of initial policies seen during the 1998 Asian crisis – a dress
rehearsal for the present crisis, from which the West learned nothing – the
intuitive reaction is to destroy industry in order to save banks. 
The verdict is still out on the third part of the prediction, the need to remove
‘free trade’ as the centerpiece of the world economic order. The Euro has
proved to constitute a new version of the ‘gold standard’, impeding what
European nations previously solved by frequent adjustment of exchange
rates: economically ‘irresponsible’ nations have traditionally been forced to
devalue. This had two beneficial effects: a) their economies were made
2internationally competitive again, and b) the value of the national debt,
which was typically issued in the national currency, was simultaneously
reduced. Italy has e.g. traditionally had a large public debt, but in lire.
So far ‘free trade’ has survived, and instead of ‘trade wars’ we have ‘cur-
rency wars’. Currency wars, however, promote huge speculative activities
and gains in the financial sector, while so-called ‘trade wars’ mainly affect
employment and the real economy. 
The present economic strategy has already caused much harm in the Euro-
pean periphery. Greek protests are in focus, but in Latvia –another country
in the European periphery – the economic hardships have generally gone
unnoticed. A so-called ‘internal devaluation’ has cut real wages by up to 30
per cent. Unemployment and low living standards force people to leave the
country, and the population has decreased by 20 per cent, from 2.38 mil-
lion to 1.9 million since 2000. Latvian birth statistics reveal a culture under
extreme pressure, as people stop having children. In 1987 42,000 children
were  born  in  Latvia,  in  2010  only  18,000.  Latvia  follows  the  classical
sequence of economic decay: 1. Deindustrialization (in the 1990s), 2. De-
agriculturalization (death of agriculture), and 3. De-population. 
A similar trend towards de-industrialization coupled with falling real wages
could first be observed in the Third World periphery, as expressed in Figure 14
in this book, using Peru as an example. After the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall,
the same mechanisms spread to the former Second World, the ex-communist
sphere. Mongolia is used as an example in the book, but the same development
– falling real wages and a fall in real wages as a percentage of GDP – also took
place in Russia. Now, finally, this crisis created by a defective economic theo-
ry neglecting the important role of manufacturing and production in general is
hitting the core of the First World itself: in the United States and in the Euro-
pean Union. The destructive forces of the neoliberal revolution first struck in
the Third World, then in the Second World, only now to hit the First World.          
The  technology  and  innovation-based  strategy  of  Ireland,  starting  around
1980, is praised in this book. Its success was indeed startling. From 1986 to
1996 the Irish growth rate was more than twice that of the OECD average,
5.1 per cent annually vs. 2.4 per cent, and in 1996 the government budget
deficit was virtually zero. Then, however, the Irish economy embarked on a
speculative building spree, a bubble that burst, including the major mistake of
the Irish government to bail out two leading banks, Anglo Irish Bank and Irish
Nationwide Building Society. For this reason, Ireland’s general government
deficit increased to the unheard of figure 32 per cent of GDP in 2010. So my
analysis of the success of the Irish technology strategy still stands. This strat-
egy also created an unusual case of ‘brain gain’, of qualified émigrés actually
coming back to work in Ireland. Now this is all turned on its head again, not
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due to a failure in industrial strategy, but because Ireland entered into a spec-
ulative bubble and bailed out banks that should have been allowed to fail, as
Norway and Sweden did a few years back.   
At this point in time the West – Europe and the United States – appear to be
locked in the remnants of the Cold War debate, in empty ritual fights between
‘left’ and ‘right’, all equally  imprisoned in the toolshed of mainstream eco-
nomic ideology. Political extremes blame the government or big business
respectively for the lack of economic dynamics, and the financial sector is in
the driver’s seat both in Europe and the United States. In the West the belief
in ‘the free market’ came with a stowaway, with an unwanted passenger: the
‘free market’ came to include the right of the financial sector to create as
much money as they wanted, to lend this money to individuals (e.g. for sub-
prime loans) and to nations (e.g. Greece) who should not have received the
loans, and to send the bill for the defaulted loans to the taxpayers in the real
economy. In other words, the ‘free market’ was defined as allowing the finan-
cial sector to create Ponzi schemes with implicit guarantees from the real
economy. In this way the financial sector, which normally operates as an
important scaffolding for the real economy – as a ‘bridge in time’ to use Key-
nes’ expression – instead became a parasite feeding on purchasing power in
the real economy. Greece, which has had to reduce real wages permanently
in order to pay banks, is but an early example of this economic parasitism.    
An interesting aspect of the financial crisis is that at one point in time finan-
cial crises, and the consequent need to control the financial sector, were well
understood over the whole political spectrum from left to right. Marx – in vol-
ume 3 of Das Kapital – clearly understands financial crises, Lenin sees the end
of capitalism when finance capital becomes dominant over industrial capital,
and – although they differed in their policy recommendations – also political-
ly conservative writers like Schumpeter and Keynes understood crises well.
Figure 4 in this book essentially differentiates between Schumpeter’s Güter-
welt – the world off goods and services – and the Rechenpfennige – the
accounting units or jetons that inhabit the world of the financial sector. Also
Hitler’s and Mussolini’s economists understood the importance of differenti-
ating between schaffendes Kapital, capital that creates value, and raffendes
Kapital, capital that only amasses wealth without creating anything. This Nazi
typology was tragically used not only to picture England as an enemy, but
also to create the murderous rhetoric towards Jews. Ironically, arguably the
most important theoretical contribution to the understanding of financial cap-
ital was written by a Jewish social democrat who was killed by the Gestapo:
Rudolf Hilferding, in his book Das Finanzkapital (1910).    
Remarkably, then, the understanding of financial crises was lost all along
the political axis – from the extreme right to the extreme left. The under-
standing was lost when neo-classical economics – based on David Ricar-do’s economics with no financial sector – became the only game in town.
The present European crisis is so insurmountable in Europe because the ide-
ologies neither to the political right nor to the political left have the neces-
sary professional understanding of what is happening. Those who saw a
financial crisis as a possibility found professional refuge only at a very few
institutions, like The University of Missouri – Kansas City, and the Levy
Institute outside New York. As we shall see later, this was not the only
knowledge lost to present mainstream economics. 
When neoclassical economics – in the tradition of Quesnay and Ricardo –
stopped distinguishing between the financial sector and the real economy,
the economics profession in effect abdicated from studying financial crises.
Not only that, the profession came to focus on trade and financial variables
rather than on production and technology. These two theoretical defects –
the failure to understand financial crises and the failure to have a realistic
theory of technology and production – combine to be increasingly destruc-
tive to the Western economies. The pragmatic focus on the productive sec-
tor which characterizes China, India, and other Asian countries is now large-
ly missing in the West. In Europe and the United States the financial sector
has become the tail wagging the dog, i.e. the real economy. 
Partly as a consequence of the loss of relevant theory, the West now faces
the double challenge described above, 1) a financial crisis and 2) rapid tech-
nological upgrading from Asian countries that now essentially follow the
Schumpeterian / Colbertian principles presented in this book. The West is
being outcompeted in what used to be their own game. This used to be us
is an appropriate title of a recent book on the challenges now facing the
Unites States
1. In 2010 the newspaper China Daily – quoting Kishore Mah-
bubani, Dean at the National University of Singapore – provided a devas-
tating, but in my view accurate, description of the problems of the West: 
“The world is entering a new era, an era marked by two major
changes. The first is the beginning of the end of Western domi-
nation - not the end of the West, though. The second is the Asian
“Renaissance”, because the 21
st century will be the century of 
Chinese and Indian economies. 
This is a Western financial crisis because the problems are the
results of Western leaders’ failure to understand that they faced a 
new competition. Western minds couldn’t think that other socie-
ties were becoming more successful than them. People in the US 
and the EU live beyond their means. Does Western wisdom say
keep borrowing despite mounting budget deficits? The West has
to “relearn” Western wisdom from the East. 
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1 Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, London, Little, Brown, 2011.Asian societies are doing well (today) because they understood
and absorbed the main pillars of Western wisdom, including the 
market, science, education and rule of law. But Western societies 
are gradually walking away from these pillars.”  
What has protected Asia from the woes of Europe and the United States?
One explanation may lie in the sheer size of China and India. These coun-
tries – like Brazil – experienced a kind of internal ideological inertia, so that
before neoliberal ideology ever became fashionable there, the destructive
powers of this ideology had become evident. Victim of a cruel shock ther-
apy, Russia was not that lucky, and democracy arrived there concomitant
with real wages being reduced by 50 per cent. 
Another important explanation for Asian exceptionalism seems to lie at the
intersection of economic theory and political action. When Joseph Schumpeter
wrote the foreword to the 1937 Japanese edition of his book The Theory of
Economic Development he made a very important point. A politically very con-
servative person himself, Schumpeter felt the need to inform his Japanese
readers how similar his understanding of economic dynamics was to that of
Karl Marx. They both looked for “the source of energy within the economic
system which would of itself disrupt any equilibrium that might be attained”.
These  forces  are  entrepreneurship  and  technical  change.  Schumpeter  also
comments that both Marx and himself have a similar theory of interest, to Marx
constant capital does not produce any surplus value, to Schumpeter the inter-
est rate under perfect equilibrium would be zero. 
Arguably Japanese and East Asian economic strategy after World War II
was achieved by a pragmatic blend of political left and right, of intellectu-
als who knew their Marx well and businessmen who understood Schum-
peterian dynamics. This prevented East Asia from pursuing a strategy of a
comparative  advantage  in  being  poor.  This  strategy  spread  across  the
region as a flying geese strategy of sequential economic upgrading (as is
explained in chapter 4 of this book). This fortunate blend of left and right –
of understanding Marxian-Schumpeterian dynamics – seems to have dom-
inated the Asian scene ever since and produced excellent results. It could
also be added that an additional Asian source of this way of thinking was
that of Sun-Yat Sen in China of the 1920s, which apparently survived in
Taiwan. This contrasts sharply with the political fault lines in the US and
Europe, presently dominated by non-constructive confrontations between
left and right. Since, by now, both the political right and the political left in
the West are based on a static Ricardian conception of the world, the
debates tend to degenerate into discussions of income distribution rather
than of how to create new wealth and jobs. Ricardo’s failure to include the
financial sector as a unit of analysis is another defect of this theory that
now proves disastrous to the real economy.      
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The West is losing wealth and power, then, because we started believing
in the propaganda version of our own economic theory. This has happened
before. In England David Ricardo’s trade theory from 1817 was a tool by
which England attempted to keep its virtual monopoly in manufacturing.
Less than one hundred years later, after the first wave of globalization,
English agriculture and industry had been seriously damaged by free trade.
The same theory which originally had been created in order to further Eng-
land’s own economic interest had boomeranged. With the United States
story history is now repeating itself. The same Ricardian trade theory that
erroneously portraits free trade as a machine producing automatic eco-
nomic harmony has now seriously weakened also the US economy. Real
wages have hardly risen compared to the early 1970s. In some cruel way,
perhaps deservedly, the propaganda theory that the West used against
their overseas colonies – that it was not necessary to industrialize and
innovate – is boomeranging again. Twice, first with England and now with
the Unites States and Europe, the loss of Western hegemony occurs when
the West itself starts believing in an economic theory which – as was so
well expressed by a US politician in the 1820s – originally had been pro-
duced for export purposes only! 
China’s and Asia’s new economic power create new dilemmas. Getting
back to my third prediction, old fashioned tariffs are likely to prove less dis-
ruptive to the world economy than the present ‘currency wars’. Although
created for the same reasons – in order to protect national production –
these two types of ‘wars by other means’ have different collateral effects.
Tariffs tend to increase production, increase wages, and thereby increase
the size of the national pie, while currency wars cause huge speculative
gains.  Mainstream  economists  fail  to  understand  that  the  tariffs  that
allowed other nations to emulate England’s industries hugely increased
world welfare, compared to what would have occurred if England had suc-
ceeded in its ‘winner-takes-it all’ of remaining the only industrialized coun-
try on the planet. Similarly, letting too much of Western manufacture end
up in Asia will in effect be another ‘winner-takes-it-all’ strategy. this time
in the disfavor of the West.     
What brought the West into the present confusion and disorder is a main-
stream economic theory that abdicated from studying key aspects of cap-
italist dynamics, including the dynamics of technology and financial crises.
The failure to understand dynamics led to a ‘tyranny of good intentions’
that frequently produced disasters. Instead of developing Africa through
industrialization – as had been the Post World War II project – well-inten-
tioned aid brought the continent from traditional colonialism into an equal-
ly humiliating ‘welfare colonialism’. The failure to understand what are
basic economic principles made it possible for European politicians to cre-
ate a “united Europe” on foundations that could not withstand normal eco-nomic gravity. The noble intention of including the peripheral EU countries
– like Greece – into the common currency, has turned out to be an eco-
nomic nightmare to the Greeks. In both situations noble intentions in a sim-
plistic neo-classical economic framework created disasters. On the other
side of the Atlantic, the presidency of Barack Obamo increasingly appears
to be another massive fallacy of noble intentions. The reasons are the
same: a dysfunctional economic theory that fails to provide the tools that
used to make change happen.   
The same unfortunate combination of noble intentions and lack of under-
standing of real-world economic dynamics also haunts European technolo-
gy policy. Having been engaged in a project for the EU Institute for Prospec-
tive Policy Studies (IPTS) my conclusion in the 2006 IPTS report was that
the technology policy of the EU essentially was a laundry list of good inten-
tions, which – because the analysis was framed in a neo-classical frame-
work – failed to come to grips with the real dynamics of world capitalism:
‘In the 42 points of the European Council Conclusions on the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy from March 22 and 
23,  2005,  the  underlying  problems  of  the  present  situation  of
Europe are not raised. The discussion appears as a long list of 
good intentions which – it seems implicitly to be assumed – nec-
essarily will lead to success. The Lisbon Strategy appears to have
been  superimposed  on  the  neo-classical  economic  framework
dominating in the 1990s, where the market is a great equaliser 
and creator of economic order and harmony. In many parts of the 
global periphery it is increasingly clear that globalisation creates 
more poverty, not less. It is reasonably clear that such trends – 
exemplified by East Germany – may be found within the EU. As I 
see it, the further debate ought to be based on an analysis of what 
went wrong in the past, and it should move away from the neo-
classical tradition of discussing policy void of its context. A policy 
may be excellent in one set of circumstances, but counterproduc-
tive in another. I argue for bringing back the Continental European
economic tradition that created Rhine Capitalism: a society where 
the market is a tool rather than a goal in itself, and where eco-
nomics is defined as the study of the economy as a real object in
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files/main//2006042407120202.pdfBoth in terms of financial and of technological dynamics the European Union
has lived in a fairytale world of simplistic neo-classical economics. Many prob-
lems have been evident for a long time, and the specific European Union issues
are have been covered in detail in two joint papers by my colleague Rainer Kat-
tel and myself. The first paper, from 2004, warns against a creeping ‘Lati-
namericanization of Europe’
3, and was followed by a paper written in 2006 and
published in 2007, claiming that the instant extension of the European Union
with a deindustrialized Eastern Europe could amount to an economic suicide
4.
There are strong parallels, then, between the failures in financial and mon-
etary policy and in technology policy: quoting from my chapter, written for
the European Union’s own research unit, both these discussions appear as
‘a long list of good intentions which – it seems implicitly to be assumed –
necessarily will lead to success’. In both aspects – in the financial crisis and
in terms of deteriorating ability to employ its population in well-paying jobs
(also referred to as ‘competitiveness’) – Europe has hit a wall. In parallel,
the decades of focus on ‘limits to growth’ have for many Europeans mutat-
ed into a belief in ‘limits to innovation’, at times almost a yearning for some
kind of technological retrogression. However, what we measure as GDP
and growth is relatively arbitrary. If the clean energy that in the future will
substitute oil initially is more expensive than its dirty predecessor, cleaning
op the planet will necessarily appear as economic growth. 
The 1972 book Limits to growth unfortunately coincided with the rise of
neoliberalism. Although the two movements are totally unrelated – the book
warned against the destructive forces of markets whereas neoliberalism
argued the exact opposite – these two forces nevertheless combined to
weaken the dynamic Schumpeterian view that the story of mankind had
been to invent itself out of problems. Although not necessarily intended so
by its authors, Limits to Growth came to be understood in a framework
which defined growth as more of the same – more fumes from petrol-driv-
en cars and more refrigerators with the same old technology – rather than
seeing growth also as innovations. If we are against growth per se we will
also easily be against the innovations we need in order to solve the crises
of the environment and of energy. The Renaissance was partly prompted
by observing a ‘Green Economy’: at the site of Ancient Rome travelers
found sheep grazing where civilization once reached a high point. This type
of ‘greening by retrogression and primitivization’ is not the kind we want.
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This situation calls for new approaches that are really old approaches.
New challenges call for a new zeitgeist, and I can think of no better intro-
duction to what ought to be the new zeitgeist of the West than Keynes
seminal article – National Self-sufficiency – written in 1933.
5 Like today,
1933 was a time of rude awakening, and the situation requires a zeit-
geist recognizing the need for de-globalization: that goods to a larger
extent must be ‘home-spun’ and that finance also ought to have a more
national character. This of course does not mean literally mean autarky
or self-sufficiency, but it means returning to the extremely successful
world model of development that ruled from 1945 until about 1973: the
visions that world prosperity requires that manufacturing industries and
advanced service sectors are distributed to all nations. 
Keynes’ 1933 article didactically takes the reader through the necessary
change in zeitgeist – the gestalt-switch – which was embarked upon in
1933 and upon which the West now again needs to embark. Keynes first
takes us through the reasoning necessary to free the mind from a belief in
free trade as a matter of ‘moral law’:  
“I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not 
only as an economic doctrine which a rational and instructed per-
son could not doubt, but almost as a part of the moral law. I 
regarded ordinary departures from it as being at the same time an
imbecility  and  an  outrage.  I  thought  England’s  unshakable  free
trade convictions, maintained for nearly a hundred years, to be
both the explanation before man and the justification before Heaven
of her economic supremacy. As lately as 1923 I was writing that free 
trade was based on fundamental “truths” which, stated with their
due qualifications, no one can dispute who is capable of understand-
ing the meaning of the words”.  
Keynes gives us compelling arguments for de-globalization, why globaliza-
tion had gone too far: ideas ought to travel freely, but goods need to a larg-
er degree than hitherto, to be homespun, and finance should be primarily
national:  
‘But experience is accumulating that remoteness between owner-
ship and operation is an evil in the relations among men, likely or 
certain in the long run to set up strains and enmities which will 
bring to nought the financial calculation.’
I sympathize, therefore, with those who would minimize, rather
than  with  those  who  would  maximize,  economic  entanglement 
among  nations.  Ideas,  knowledge,  science,  hospitality,  travel  –
5 Reprinted in John Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings, Macmillan / Cambridge University
Press, vol. XXI, pp. 233-246, 1982. 11
these are the things which should of their nature be international. 
But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conve-
niently possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national.
Yet, at the same time, those who seek to disembarrass a country
of its entanglements should be very slow and wary. It should not 
be a matter of tearing up roots but of slowly training a plant to 
grow in a different direction.’
‘For these strong reasons, therefore, I am inclined to the belief 
that, after the transition is accomplished, a greater measure of
national self-sufficiency and economic isolation among countries
than existed in 1914 may tend to serve the cause of peace, rather 
than otherwise. At any rate, the age of economic internationalism
was not particularly successful in avoiding war; and if its friends
retort, that the imperfection of its success never gave it a fair 
chance,  it  is  reasonable  to  point  out  that  a  greater  success  is
scarcely probable in the coming years.
Global free trade did not deliver on its promise of global peace, although this
was once a key argument for free trade. Obviously today’s context is differ-
ent than that of 1933, but my argument is that since the very same type of
economic forces are at work today – although in a different context – the
solution to the problem lies in the same recommendations Keynes had. I am
suggesting that this is the direction we need to move, but the recommenda-
tions should not be taken literally. We must keep in mind that the policies here
outlined by Keynes – NOT a religious belief in free trade – became the foun-
dations for the policies that produced unprecedented high economic growth
in the world until the mid-1970s. Confessing to possible bias because the
author is my son, a recent book in my view convincingly shows that Euro-
pean economic growth over the centuries has always been based on the prin-
ciple of emulation rather than on the principle of free trade, suggesting that
the history of economic thought in this aspect needs to be re-written
6. 
Keynes then turns to what we today would call environmental issues: 
The  same  rule  of  self-destructive  financial  calculation  governs 
every  walk  of  life.  We  destroy  the  beauty  of  the  countryside
because the unappropriated splendors of nature have no econo-
mic value. We are capable of shutting off the sun and the stars 
because they do not pay a dividend. London is one of the richest
cities in the history of civilization, but it cannot “afford” the high-
est standards of achievement of which its own living citizens are
capable, because they do not “pay.”
6 Reinert, Sophus A, Translating Empire – Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy, Cam-
bridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 2011. 12
The  decadent  international  but  individualistic  capitalism,  in  the 
hands of which we found ourselves after the war, is not a suc-
cess. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not
virtuous—and it doesn’t deliver the goods. In short, we dislike it,
and we are beginning to despise it. But when we wonder what to 
put in its place, we are extremely perplexed….. We are – all of us,
I expect – about to make many mistakes. No one can tell which
of the new systems will prove itself best.
The road ahead is now better defined than in 1933, when a planned econ-
omy was one of the possibilities open to the world. However, as a starting
point we still have to get rid of what Keynes called the ‘bundle of obsolete
habiliments one’s mind drags round’. A key obsolete notion is that all eco-
nomic activities should be seen as being qualitatively alike, as is implicit in
Ricardian trade theory. Since economic activities in reality differ so widely
in terms of their ability to create welfare – which this book attempts to
explain – a strategy to maximize world real income and welfare requires
very different policies than the present economic strategy that instead max-
imizes international trade. 
A new course could therefore, in my view, also be beneficial to the nations
which at first glance may appear to be losing for a new and Colbertian eco-
nomic order. As I stated in the foreword to the Chinese translation of this
book: “It may initially sound illogical, but as wages and employment rates in
many European countries and in the United States slide, it may in fact be in
China’s long-term interest to allow some protectionism in these countries.
Protecting parts of the industrial system of the United States and Europe
would safeguard the future size of overseas markets for Chinese goods.”  
The devastating effects of the present crises are a direct result of the loss
of a whole theoretical tradition based on qualitative understanding of the
economy – of economics as an Erfahrungswissenschaft, a science of expe-
rience – based on an understanding of history rather than on mathematics.
In this Continental European tradition – from Karl Marx to the left to Joseph
Schumpeter to the right – financial crises are a normal feature of capital-
ism. Because this type of theory also carries with it an understanding of the
role of technology, this Continental European type of theory also explains
uneven economic development. It is my hope that this kind of experience-
based economic theory – in the tradition of which this book is written –
again will become influential in Europe. It is our turn not to criticize, but to
emulate China’s investments in new technology and infrastructure. 
We face a quadruple challenge: a financial crisis, an energy crisis, an envi-
ronmental crisis, and a crisis of unemployment. There is also a serious cri-
sis of unbalance between the core and peripheral countries of the European
Union. Either the uncompetitive peripheral countries become at the receiv-13
ing end of Colbertian economic policies – including a break-up of the Euro
– or a large number of the inhabitants of these countries will physically
move to the core countries. However, Greeks moving to Germany is a solu-
tion wanted neither by the Greeks nor by the Germans. There are important
lessons to be drawn by Europe from how Argentina escaped from its crisis
a decade ego, default and exchange rate flexibility are two important ones.  
Capital must be channeled from financial speculation into the employment
of underutilized human resources to solve the energy and environmental
crises. Polluting oil is just as unlikely to be mankind’s last source of energy
as horses were, but as the age of complete dominance on oil is approach-
ing an end we face similar uncertainties as when the age of horse-drawn
carriages was coming to an end. The 1890s saw prototypes both of steam
cars and electrical cars, but the solution came from an outsider, from Karl
Friedrich Benz and the gasoline-powered car. Today we are facing similar
technological uncertainties and therefore need to throw resources at many
possible solutions. If inflation is a necessary part of quelling the dominance
of the financial sector, so be it. The financial crisis of the 1970s – normal-
ly called the oil crisis – was also solved partly though inflation.
Today’s economic theory has lost key features of what built Western civi-
lization, both of the Renaissance and of the Enlightenment. The core of
what I call The Other Canon of Economics lies in qualitative features of Ren-
aissance societies that are not compatible – not possible to include – in the
excessively formal structures of today’s mainstream economics
7. 
The core of the Renaissance was über-Schumpeterian: the magna facere
that created great innovations in art and in the production of everything
from weaponry to irrigation canals was a way of thinking big that went far
beyond profit-making. What came to characterize the Western economy
was that building organizations did not stop when the owner had enough
money  to  feed  his  family.  Renaissance  magna  facere went  far  beyond
greed, and – as described in this book – already in the 1200s the wealth
of Florence was seen as emerging from a ben commune, a synergic com-
mon weal that was in itself a unit of analysis. 
7 See Reinert, Erik & Arno Daastøl, ‘The Other Canon: The History of Renaissance Economics. Its
Role as an Immaterial and Production-based Canon in the History of Economic Thought and in the
History of Economic Policy’. In Reinert, Erik (ed.), Globalization, Economic Development and Inequal-
ity: An Alternative Perspective, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004, pp. 21-70. We have argued that
the key to European execptionalism lies in the Renaissance duty to invent which contrasts the iner-
tia of status quo typical of traditional societies: Reinert, Erik & Arno Daastøl, ‘Exploring the Genesis
of Economic Innovations: The religious gestalt-switch and the duty to invent as preconditions for
economic growth’ in European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 4, No. 2/3, 1997, pp. 233-283,
and in Christian Wolff. Gesammelte Werke, IIIrd series, Vol. 45, Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag,
1998. The implications of this for government policy is outlines in my ‘The Role of the State in Eco-
nomic Growth.’ in Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 26, No. 4/5, 1999, pp. 268-32. 14
Renaissance  Florence  also  understood  the  need  to  prevent  speculation.
Transporting food out of the city was prohibited, this could feed specula-
tion. Renaissance cities also managed to create what John Kenneth Gal-
braith dubbed a balance of countervailing power. The Florentine govern-
ment – the signoría – consisted of nine members, representing different
professions, and only one of them represented the financial sector. Renais-
sance cities also frequently rotated their elected administrators to prevent
corruption, and Florence specifically cultivated its urban culture – of manu-
facturing and trading – by keeping the producers of raw materials, the big
land owners, away from any political power. In the world of today we still
see how the absence of a manufacturing sector is part of a pattern of unde-
mocratic governments, even if the raw material is as valuable as oil.       
Two key features of the Enlightenment are also lost in today’s economics:
the ability to build classification systems, as Linnaeus did, and to under-
stand the limits that need to be set for private greed
8. As I argue in this
book, a key feature of mainstream economics is its inability to qualitatively
distinguish between economic activities. The apparent accuracy of neo-
classical economics is a direct result of its failure to make qualitative dis-
tinctions. We all understand that if all medical doctors of Paris are put in
one country and all the people who wash the floors of Parisian hospitals in
another, we get one rich country of medical doctors and one poor country
of cleaning ladies. This common-sense proposition is unfathomable in Ricar-
dian trade theory, because world trade is modeled as the bartering of labour
hours, all assumed to be of the same quality. This was the English way of
trying to convince the colonies to stay with their comparative advantage in
being poor and ignorant. Now this same theory is boomeranging and mak-
ing the West poorer. 
With the coming of neoliberalism the key Enlightenment debate on the lim-
its of self-interest – a debate which lasted virtually through the whole of
the 18
th century – was lost. Having unlearned the wisdom that came out
of this debate, the present discussion more often than not totally misses
the point by discussing greed per se as an evil. The conclusion of the
Enlightenment debate was boiled down to one sentence by Milanese econ-
omist Pietro Verri in 1771: ‘…the private interest of each individual, when
it coincides with the public interests, is always the safest guarantor of pub-
lic happiness’. In other words, greed – or magna facere for any other rea-
son – is good as long as the end effect contributes to making the eco-
8 A more detailed argument on the subject of taxonomies is found in my paper ‘The Terrible Sim-
plifers: Common Origins of Financial Crises and Persistent Poverty in Economic Theory and the new
‘1848 Moment’’, UN DESA Working Paper No. 88, December 2009, and in Sundaram. Jomo
Kwame and Anis Chowdhury, Poor Poverty. The Impoverishment of Analysis, Measurement and
Policies, London, Bloomsbury in association with The United Nations, 2011, pp. 11-37. 15
nomic pie larger. With neoclassical economics the public interest – socie-
ty – ceased to exist as a unit of analysis. This opened up for today’s view
that all greed is good, even the present greed of the financial sector which
creates huge private wealth while shrinking the real economy to the detri-
ment of the public interest.                 
At its nucleus, mainstream economics describes Adam Smith’s savage who
has learned to barter, not Schumpeter’s savage who has learned to inno-
vate. Like new medicines which fail to get government approval, sophisti-
cated economic models that may approach reality generally fail to reach pol-
icy level. The world is mostly ruled by the crudest of economic models. 
Now is the time to rediscover the 18
th century science of economic decline,
which came into being as formerly immensely rich city states – like Flo-
rence, Venice, and the Dutch Republic – were losing wealth and power to
increasingly successful nations-states like England and France. The present
choice of the West is between declining like Venice, an absolute decline into
a type of museum, or to decline like the Dutch Republic, no longer being
the wealthiest, but still wealthy. In order to achieve the latter goal, we must
selectively  deglobalize,  bring  back  Colbertism,  and  with  it  an  economic
understanding that entails all the key principles that made Europe unique in
the first place: the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. After all, free trade
has only ruled the world in two very brief periods of human history, the late
1800s and the late 1900s and early 2000s. In both periods the cult of free
trade came to an end for the same reasons: not only did free trade as a goal
rather than a tool create intolerable poverty in the world periphery, it start-
ed an economic decline at the very core of capitalism.16
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